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Introduction 
The French urban planning system and land policy often arouse interest or admiration 
in foreign countries. French urban planners have created originalland use tools， such 
as the Legal Density Ceiling， a kind of land tax that the Brazilian Government has been 
considering adopting， and that American experts have studied with much interest. 
Furthermore， the strong land-use control policy enforced after the second World War 
in France has enabled the government authorities to face the huge demand in public 
facilities induced by the rapid post-war urban growth， and to fulfil part of the needs of 
housing， particularly in the public housing sector. 
Nevertheless， 50years on， itcan be seen that although some quantitative objectives have 
been satisfied， itis not the case for the qualitative goals. The recent events in some Fr 
ench“grands ensembles" Cequivalent to Japanese danchi， high-density housing areas 
located in the outskirts of cities)， although far from reaching the levels of violence of 
American riots in the black ghettos， have highlighted the mistakes and the limitations 
of the public-oriented urban planning policies of the 1960s and 1970s. The results of the 
original land tools created or developed in France are no better. These tools have 
generally missed their targets， and have had repercussions on land and real-estate 
markets. Moreover， the economic and political context has changed dramatically since 
the beginning of the 1980s， thus challenging the objectives and practice of land policy， 
forcing it to move towards a new “land paradigm" . 
In order to comprehend the importance of these transformations， we must return to the 
origins of the public land policies， which go back to the late 1950s. 
1. From the Post-war Period to the Administrative Decentralisation (1950-1982) 
Before the end of the 1950s， land matters were not considered to be an important issue 
in France. The main reason is that， unlike in some other European countries， there is no 
dramatic lack of space in our country. Of the 55 million hectares 030 million acres) 
cities occupy only 3% Cas opposed to 10% in other European countries)， industry takes 
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up 0，4%， the entire transport infrastructure 2%， agricultura1 1and accounts for 60%， 
forests 27% and fallow fie1ds 7%. In other European countries， greater human density 
ob1iged government authorities to imp1ement 1and markets regu1ation and 1and-use 
contro1 measures as early as the beginning of this century， whi1e French cities cou1d 
easi1y absorb urban growth by extending their urban areas. 
But soon after the end of the second World War， France experienced a shortage of 
housing， worsened by the many damaged areas to be rebui1d. Faced with the necessity 
to take emergency measures， the centra1 government and the 10ca1 authorities began to 
intervene on the 1and markets， main1y in suburban areas. 
In 1958， Priority Deve10pment Zones CZUPs， Zones a Urbaniser en Prioritる)were created. 
In these zones， the government authorities cou1d acquire 1and Cby compu1sory purchase， 
pr・e-emptionOor negotiation)， deve10p 1and and provide the necessary pub1ic faci1ities， 
and finally sel deve10ped 1and to private deve1opers. The purpose was to reduce the 
chronic shortage of pub1ic faci1ities and boost 1eve1s to equa1 those of urban growth， 
and to provide the popu1ation with new housing. 
The ZUPs were to become the well known “grands ensemb1es" Cd，αnchi) which are so 
prob1ematic today. They were generally created in remote parts of the cities， where 
1and was comparative1y cheap. Bad1y served by pub1ic transport， they were to become 
a kind of ghetto， with a high concentration of job1ess peop1e 1iving in decaying high rise 
tower b1ocks. 
Despite the strong government intervention in the ZUPs， this procedure turned out to be 
ineffective in preventing 1and specu1ation. On the contrary， the rise of deve10ped 1and 
prices in the ZUPs spread over neighbouring areas， causing a 1and-price boom in the 
1arge cities from 1958 to 1963. To strugg1e against 1and specu1ation and to contro1 
1and-use， the 10ca1 authorities were then empowered in 1962 to exercise a pre-emption 
right Cthe right to purchase in priority a property put up for sa1e) in new zones that 
they cou1d define within future urban zones in the suburban areas. These new zones 
were called “Zones d' Amenagement differe "， CDeferred Deve10pment Zones). 
The 1and boom of 1958-1963 aroused discussions on how to contro1 further urban 
growth whi1e preventing 1and specu1ation. This 1ed to the adoption of a determining 
Act in 1967， the Basic Land Act. This act can be compared to the Japanese City Act of 
1968 Ctoshi kihon ho)， inthe sense that it stil constitutes the framework of the urban 
p1anning concepts and practices. It brings into genera1 use the two 1eve1s in urban 
p1anning ru1es existing since 1958. The 8tructure P1ans CShemas Directeur d'Ameage-
ment et d'Urbanisme) rep1ace the former Master P1ans CP1ans Directeurs) and the 
Land Use P1ans CP1ans d'Occupation des 801s) rep1ace the former Comprehensive P1ans 
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CPlans de Detail). 
The Structure Plans are made at a supra-municipallevel and provide the general details 
of land-use on a long-term basis Cabout 15 years). They give details concerning the 
transport network， public facilities， the location of the main services and activities and 
the preferred location of any future urban areas. In some areas， they cover a great 
number of municipalities Cup to 160 in the Metz area). 
The Land Use Plans， made at a municipallevel， are much more detailed. Theyestablish 
the conditions of land-use in various zones， ranging from urban to rural areas they 
also specify sites for public use and the various land charge affecting the area. Unlike 
the Structure Plans， they are legally binding. 
The main innovation of the Basic Land Act is the introduction of a new kind of urban 
planning zone called ZACs CZones d'Amenagement Concerte Comprehensive Develop-
ment Areas. Like the Japanese toshi sαikaihαtsu kuiki， these zones are aimed at 
transferring the financing of new public facilities to the private sector by promoting the 
partnership between public and private bodies Cby negotiating the land-use rules within 
the zones). 
Two different kinds of Comprehensive Development Areas are to be distinguished : the 
“public ZACs"， which replace the ZUPs， and the “private ZACs" where private 
developers undertake the risks of the development. In fact， most of the ZACs were to be 
developed by semi-public companies in public ZACs， where the loans were usually 
guatanteed by the local authorities. In these zones， housing for sale and rented housing 
were most1y subsidised by the State. 
From 1965 to 1975， many changes occurred in the urban planning general context. The 
pace of urban growth having decreased， the burdens on the housing market became less 
worrying and the rise in land value tended to slow down. The oil crisis of the mid-1970s 
also marked the end of the 30“glorious years" of high economic growth of the 
post-war period Cranked second in the world， after the Japanese Kodo Seicho). After 
having built a huge number of high rises in the suburbs of cities al over France Cin the 
ZUPs)， the government authorities were eager to redevelop the decayed areas around 
town centres， by bulldozing the old buildings in order to build medium-density projects. 
On the other hand， the blossoming of ecological issues focused on the quality of life and 
promoted the construction of houses on the urban fringes. 
The government authorities were therefore more preoccupied in controlling the density 
of the projects in the centre of towns， whilst trying to secure part of the benefits 
induced by the higher building density. This led to the passing of the Galley Act in 1975， 
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which instituted two new urban planning tools : the Legal Density Ceiling (Plafond 
Legal de Densitの， and the Land Intervention Zones (Zones d'Intervention Foncier・e).
1) The Legal Density Ceiling limits the right to build of the land owner to a ceiling fixed 
to ONE square meter of floor area per square meter of land area. Originally， this rate 
applied to the whole of France， except in Paris where it was 1，5 (both ceilings 
correspond to a Japanese Floor Area Ratio of respectively 100% for France and 150% 
for Paris). In places where town planning rules allow， an owner may build at a density 
higher than the Legal Density Ceiling， on condition that he/ she pays a fee equivalent to 
the value of the area of extra land needed in order not to be over the Legal Density 
Ceiling. 
Three conflicting goals were set for the Legal Density Ceiling， namely to bring down 
land values， tolimit building density， and to increase the financial resources of the local 
authorities. In fact， this tool which gave rise to passionate discussions and arguments 
Cit was even accused of setting out the “collectivisation" of land) only managed to 
achieve the third goal. It became an ordinary tax mainly levied in the rich municipalities 
of the Western part of the Paris area， where the land values are extremely high and 
where a tremendous amount of office space was created in the late 1980s. In these areas， 
the Legal Density Ceiling did not prevent the land boom， nor the construction of a great 
number of high-rise office buildings. 
2) The Land intervention Zones were aimed at completing the pre-emption zoning 
system in the suburbs (Deferred Development Zones)， introducing the pre-emption 
right into existing urban zones. They were to be designed in towns having more than 
10000 inhabitants and being endowed with a Land Use Plan. They were expected to 
reach two goals， namely to secure the public land-use control for future projects， and 
to put land in reserve by taking advantage of opportunities of purchasing land in the 
centre of cities. 
The major innovation of the Land Intervention Zones was the introduction of a three 
year grant by the central government to the local authorities， tohelp them acquire land. 
However， in1982， the decentralisation process brought an end to this timid financial 
endeavour， while the local authorities having a Land Use Plan were entitled to excercise 
an “urban pre-emption right" in the existing and future urban zones (replacing the 
former Deferred Development Zones and Land Intervention Zones). The results of the 
pre-emption right were no better than those of the Legal Density Ceiling， because the 
local authorities did not use itat al as expected. They did not use it as a means to 
acquire land or real-estate (only 1% of sale notifications are followed by a public 
purchase)， nor as a way to prevent speculation， but mainly to achieve a particular 
objective， which was to survey the land markets on their territory Cinformation on land 
Aveline: Urban Land Market and Land Policy in France 143 
markets being hard to access in France， as explained later). Some local authorities also 
used the pre-emption right for hidden objectives， such as to avoid “undesirable" 
projects Ci.e. residences for immigrants) by filtering prospective land purchasers. 
2. The Decentralisation of Urban Planning Prerogatives (1982・1983)
The 1980s was a decade of great change in the context of land policy. The drastic 
modifications of the economic and urban environment， as well as the transfer of the 
urban planning prerogatives to the local authorities， gradually demolished the 
traditional conception of land policy， whose main features were an almost single-path 
developing process (the public development path) and a general desire to remove land 
from the market economy by exerting strong public control over land-use. The new 
context brought an end of the large projects implemented in the city suburbs. 
1) A dramatic change of the economic context 
The early 1980s marked the end of a long period of inflation， during which actual 
interest rates (nominal interest rate-inflation rate) had been maintained at a negative 
value. Before the 1980s it was very profitable to get into debt and to make land reserves. 
The sudden rise in the actual interest rates to rather high positive values (6・7%)
suddenly made the saving of land very costly， and forced developers to take into 
account the enormous financial risks of the urban planning projects. 
2) The transformation of the urban context 
The exceptional post-war urban growth had come to an end. The purpose of urban 
planning policies was no longer to urbanise new areas around cities， but to limit the use 
of non-urban space by increasing the density of urban zones. Future urban development 
thus concerned already existing zones and land purchase became more difficult and 
more cost1y. 
3) The modifications of the institutional environment. 
The local authorities were empowered with the whole range of land and urban planning 
tools， although the central government could intervene if necessary. However， the 
decentralisation process was the root of the various problems : 
-problems of co-operation between municipalities. 
The use of urban planning prerogatives at a municipal level made the lack of supra-
municipal structures more problematic than before. One must remember that France 
has no less than 36551 municipalities， that is about 10 times the Japanese figure， 
whereas the Japanese population is twice as high as the French one ! In France， the 
municipallevel is thus too narrow to enable efficient land policies. What is more， the 
lack of supra-municipal bodies (municipal co-operation systems) prevents the creation 
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of public land agencies whose financial resources could be based on additional taxes at 
supra-municipallevel. Such agencies were created to build new towns and proved to be 
very efficient. The lack of municipal co-operation also hampers the creation of 
Structure Plans in large cities. In 1995， only 6800 municipalities (among 36551) were 
covered by a properly approved Structure Plan. 
-the disengagement of government authorities from land markets 
Although the local authorities had the use of land control tools， they did not have the 
financial means to enforce them. Moreover， the disengagement of the central govern-
ment in the social housing sector dramatically changed the conditions of financial 
equilibrium in the ZACs. Up until the early 1980s， the budgets of ZAC projects had been 
consistent1y balanced by regular investments in the public housing sector by the State. 
The economy of these projects was therefore the concern of the planned economic 
sector， concerned with housing unit numbers as well as housing prices. After the 
beginning of the 1980s， the f10w of public housing construction tended to dry up， while 
new urban planning projects became more difficult to implement on account of their 
location within existing urban zones. The local authorities tried consequent1y to 
increase new projects， within ZACs， involving partnerships with private developers. The 
early 1980s also marked the rapid development of the tertiary sector. Combined with the 
financial deregulation process， this factor led to an increase in the demand for office 
space. This began in the Paris area， then spread to other metropolitan areas. The urban 
planning process fits in well with this new demand， by subjecting the projects to market 
conditions and by granting the private developers a determining position. 
-the unstable nature of the Land Use Plans. 
Although a great number of small municipalities did not have enough financial means 
to be endowed with a Land Use Plan， the majority of large cities seized this tool Cin 
1995， 18000 municipalities were endowed with a Land Use Plan， concerning about 93% 
of the French population). However， the town councils which are closer to local 
interests than the State， tend to abuse of procedures allowing， incertain cases， changes 
in the provisions of the plans. 
The are two procedures allowing such a change: 
i) the “modification" of the Land use Plan. This is a flexible procedure， easy to 
implement， but only concerning minor points (however， some town councils use it to 
extend the urban zones on land under their administration). 
i) the “revision" of the Land Use Plan. This procedure is much more time-consuming 
and complicated to put into practice Cit isquite similar to the creation of a Land Use 
Plan)， but the town council can enforce in advance a Land Use Plan under revision. 
Among municipalities having more than 10000 inhabitants， about 40% of the approved 
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Land Use Plan were under revision in 1995. This means that their economy was going 
to change drastically in the short-term. 
This unstable nature of the urban planning documents is a major cause of uncertainty 
for developers， and paved the way for speculative anticipation of al sorts during the 
late 1980's. 
-the growing complexity of the decision-making process 
In increasing the administrative powers at locallevel， the decentralisation multiplied the 
number of local figures in a position to intervene in the urban planning decisions and 
thus complicated the context of the public action. During the 1980s， a great number of 
associations of various kinds， ranging from NIMBY2) to ecology-oriented types， have 
emerged. Since there is no room， inthe French legal framework and practices， for 
negotiation before implementation of a project Oike nemawashi in Japan)， the conflicts 
between local authorities and associations tend to be solved through legal procedures， 
after the construction process has started. The severe increase in litigation is a 
constraint for developers， and often provokes a freezing of projects. Between 1975 and 
1991， the number of cases of in the field of urban planning increased tenfold (from 1980 
to 20000 applications). The average period for judging a case is close on 2 and a half 
years， which is extremely long when considering the high interest rates. 
3. The Land Boom of the Late 1980's 
In the early 1980s， the progressive transition from an administratively controlled land 
economy to a more market-oriented land economy， provoked the emergence of a “land 
bubble" in Paris， around 1985， which surprisingly shared similar features with the 
Japanese tochi baburu. As in Tokyo， the bubble formed around the commercialland 
market (office buildings)， more volatile and less regulated than the housing land 
market， and the land values increased threefold in Paris (20 wards) from 1985 to 1989 
(from 6900FF / sqm to 22600 FF / sqm3)). In 1985， the removal of the “agreement" 
procedure4) in the Paris area allowed developers once again to erect office buildings 
in the municipalities of the Western Paris area， where foreign investors were eager 
to invest their money. ZAC projects involving office space construction or mixed 
development (office space and housing construction) increased dramatically in this 
part of Paris and next in the major metropolitan areas， thus causing a land boom in 
other large cities. 
However， after 1990， the supply in office space exceeded demand， and the “bubble" 
burst， provoking a structural crisis in the real-estate sector. In 1996， vacant office space 
totals 5 million square meters in the Paris area (Ile de France). Many real-estate 
developers and equivalent to jiαge-yαwent bankrupt， and some financial institutions 
were also severely affected (namely the Comptoir des Entrepreneurs， Creit Lyonnais 
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and Creit Foncier). The real-estate crisis will cost the French State more than 40 billion 
francs. That is to say at least 2500FF (50000 yens) per household. But， for the moment， 
the public funded rescue has been applied only to public financial institutions and in 
such a way that there has been no resulting shift in public opmlOn against the 
tax-payers participation in the rescue plans. 
4. From 1990 to Nowadays 
The speculative phenomenon aggravated the tensions in the housing market and 
favoured riots in the “grands ensembles" (dlαnchi). The government authorities thus 
tried to set up a complete plan of action against spatial segregation， by promoting 
combined housing for various sociallevels within central areas of towns. In 1991， the 
Basic Town Act (Loi d'Orientation pour la Ville) was adopted. This Act promotes 
various new land tools allowing the local authorities (or failing that， the central 
government) to build public housing in city centres. These tools are as follows : 
四creationof public land agencies at a supra-municipal level， allowed to levy an 
additional tax in order to buy land 
-obliging the developers to pay a tax for each new construction project， devoted to the 
construction of new public housing units (also levied by the Land Agency). This tax 
may take the form of a gift of land. 
-obliging municipalities having more than 200000 inhabitants to maintain a ratio of 
public housing above 20%. In the negative case， these municipalities must pay a yearly 
tax. 
However， the adoption of the Basic Town Act occurred at the very moment of the 
bursting of the bubble， and the government authorities then got reluctant to enforce it. 
The enforcement of the act was first delayed to 1994， and finally the Act itself was taken 
to pieces in 1995， with the removal of the tax on new construction projects. 
5. Towards What Land Policy for the Future ? 
The failure of the Basic Town Act has not stopped the local authorities from continuing 
to think through future land policies. From 1991 to 1995， several committees of experts 
were formed to think over measures regarding land to be taken. The outlines of their 
reports are as follows : 
1) To put an end to the freezing of ZAC projects. 
The real-estate cnSlS (particularly in the office-space market) has dramatically 
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affected ZAC projects where the construction of public housing units was to be balanced 
by selling at a high value land devoted to office space. Most of these projects are now 
on stand-by， because developers prefer to keep their land Cand shoulder the financial 
burden) and wait for better times， than to sel it at a vastly discounted price. Many of 
these projects are being carried out by semi-public developers， and the local authorities 
have generally guaranteed their loans， so the burden is going to be transferred to the 
citizen by means of the local tax. The contents of these ZAC projects should thus be 
rapidly transformed Cfor example， toprovide housing instead of office space)， and the 
land should be quickly sold， even at a much lower price. 
According to the nature of the ZACs， two ways out are recommended by the experts. In 
the public ZACs， the local authority should take care of the financial deficit created by 
the decreasing land values， but this should in return allow the building of public 
housing. In the private ZACs， the private developers should try to find solutions with 
their financial partners. 
2) To strengthen the land control of the local authorities 
Land agencies should be created on a supra-municipallevel. In the metropolitan areas 
where municipal co-operation is lacking， the central government could take the 
initiative in creating such agencies. However， considering the failure of the Basic Town 
Act in this respect Conly two land agencies have been created up to 1995 on a national 
level) ， doubts are cast over the value of this advice. 
3) To improve the implementation of the urban planning law. 
There is an urgent need to stabilise the Land Use Plans， to reform the urban pre-
emption right and to better specify the conditions to submit for an out“of-court 
settlement against urban planning decisions. 
-stabilisation of the Land Use Plans : the “revision" of a plan should be prohibited for a 
period of three years after adoption of the plan by the town council. The “modification" 
a Land Use Plan should no longer allow the creation or the extension of existing or 
future urban zones. 
-the reform of the pre-emption right : the peculiar use of this tool by the town councils 
leads to some experts calling for its suppression. Most of them are favourable to 
maintain it， provided the local authorities give special justification when exerting it， and 
provided the owners are guaranteed not to be abused in their right. 
-better specification of the conditions to submit for an out-of-court settlement against 
urban planning decisions : conciliation procedures should be developed to free the civil 
courts. 
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4) To reform the land tax system. 
The French land tax system has the major drawback to hit more the “flow" than the 
“stock"， inother words to hamper the construction and to favour the keeping of land. 
-the taxation on urban development 
Unlike other many European countries， the French development tax is paid by the 
developers and not by the land owners， except in three departments (equivalent to the 
Japanese ken) where the German right has left some traces5). The Local Development 
Tax (Taxe Locale d'Equipement) introduced in 1967 is imposed on the developer for 
each new project， except in the ZACs. However， the income of this tax only covers 
1/ 5 to 1/ 3 of the development costs of the new projects. Additional taxes have 
consequently flourished， and the system has become extremely complicated. There are 
now 16 different taxes， some of them being simultaneously imposed. The experts 
propose that this system be simplified. In order to increase the participation of land 
owners， they call for a new yearly tax on land property， based on market values. While 
plans for a new tax on land have been regularly proposed， every 10 years， since the 
early 1960s (1962， 1967， 1975， 1982，1995) they has never succeeded. 
-taxation on land and real-estate property 
As in Japan (at least before the tax revision of 1991)， the tax on land hits land transfer 
more than land ownership， thus hampering the fluidity of the land markets. The tax on 
real-estate transactions in France appears to be one of the highest in the European 
countries (about 8% on the purchasing value， as opposed to only 2% in GB). Moreover， 
the taxation of land and real-estate property is completely archaic ; the tax on land 
(Taxe Fonciere sur les Proprietes Non Baties) is based on land rental values which have 
not been revalued since 1961， and tends to under-estimate the taxation of idle land 
within urban zones (because the tax is very light as long as the land owner has not 
declared his intention to build). 
In 1990 a reform was adopted to solve this problem. A new fiscal category of idle land， 
called “building land" (terrain constructible)， was introduced in urban zones. The local 
authorities can decide to introduce this new category in order to increase noticeably the 
taxation on urban land (but no one has done it yet). Furthermore， the reform revalues 
al the tax bases at a nationallevel (90 million parcels are concerned). 
Although the revision of the tax bases cost the French tax-payers 2 billion francs， no 
government (no matter its politicalleanings) has enforced the new bases yet， because 
it would be too unpopular (according to estimations of the Ministry of Finance， it
would increase the tax bases for residential use by 78%). 
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5) More transparency in the land markets 
In France， information on land transactions is subjected to very strict rules， thus 
making the surveillance of land markets extremely diffic叫tfor interested parties， both 
public and private. This is why local authorities use their pre-emption right to collect 
information on land values Cprices proposed by sellers) on land under their administra-
tion. 
Yet we have in France a registration system for land transactions， which allows the tax 
administrators and the sollicitors to collect comprehensive information on land C values， 
surface etc.). These data has been recorded since 1955 in a file called “The Real‘Estate 
File" CFichier immobilier)， which can be considered a source of reliable information. 
However， access to this data is extremely difficult and cost1y to obtain， except in the 
three departments of Alsace-Moselle mentioned before . Besides， the tax administrators 
are exceedingly reluctant to reveal this information. 
In 1982， the Giraud Bil made an attempt to create freer access to land information. The 
bil stipulated that each recording of land transactions should be copied and sent to the 
relevant local and county authorities and that this information should be open to the 
public. But this bil was not even submitted to Parliament. The experts demand the 
adoption of this bil， and suggest that the files be computerised in order to fit in with the 
computerisation of the cadastral matrices. 
Conclusion 
As one can see， there is no attempt to enforce drastic reforms regarding land policy， 
despite the serious changes that occured in the 1980s on the land markets. There is a 
consensus amongst experts and officials to keep the existing urban-planning tools， and 
to accept the disengagement of the State. The tendency is to“adjust" the application of 
these tools， by correcting or preventing their side effects. 
The only “drastic" measure called for by the experts is the introduction of a new tax on 
property， based on the market value. Such a tax would be aimed at fulfilling two 
objectives : i)to involve the owners in the development costs; i) to discourage the 
retention of urban land by increasing the tax burden. However， a similar proposal has 
been put forward several times since the 1960s and there is no reason why it should be 
taken seriously this time. Furthermore， one can also doubt that the enforcement of the 
new tax bases and the adoption of the Giraud Bil will come into effect in the near 
future. 
Consequent1y， the only measures that may be expected in the short-term are the prog 
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reSSlve “thaw" of the ZAC projects (this will finally affect the tax-payers)， and an 
improvement in the practice of the urban planning law. 
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Notes 
1) The procedure of compulsory purchase was introduced in 1810 (the Baron Hausmann made wide 
use of it at the end of the 19th century). In 19日， its use was extended to the building of houses 
and industrial plants， then it was widely used in the ZUP zones after 1958. The pre-emption right 
was introduced in the ZUP zones in 1958. It gives the local authority priority in purchasing land 
or real-estate put up for sale. 
2)“Not In My Back Yard"， associations promoting the interests of the land-owners in廿1evicinity 
of a project. 
3) From 138瓜灼 to452航lOyens/sqm. Yet the land values in Tokyo remained on average 14 times 
higher than those observed in France. 
4) The “procedure d'agrement" was introduced in 1鋭治 toslow down the concentration of office 
space in the Western part of the Paris area.ln this region， developers wanting to develop more 
than 1∞o sq.meters office space were obliged to submit their project for the agreement of the 
Ministry in charge of Urban Planning. The removal of this procedure， by raising a 20 year 
constraint， provoked a dramatic surge in the office buildings construction， in the same 
proportions as in Tokyo (between 1985 and 1叩1， the stock of office space in Paris area increased 
by 40%). 
5) These three departments are located in the north.est of France， in a region formerly occupied 
by Germany CHaut Rhin， Bas-Rhin and Moselle). They have kept a rule of local law which 
imposes a “tax on residents" (taxe de riverainete). Namely on the owners of plots adjoining a 
new municipal road. We also have in France a procedure of urban land readjustment where the 
land owners must make a contribution to the development costs， but it has never been very 
popular in France， because of the inflexibility of the legal procedure (for a comparison between 
Japanese and French land readjustment systems， see Francois et Natacha A veline， 
“remembrement urbain a la Japonaise" Urbanisme et Architecture n.252， November 1991， 
pp.臼ー 臼.
6) In these 3 departments， there is a “Land Book" (Livre Foncier)， a legacy of the German law， 
which contains the same information as in the "Real-estate File"， but access to which is easy and 
quite fre. 
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